Doesn't the causal chain run the other way? The White House chose escalation against a state whose almost entire deterrent leverage is geographic. The strait didn't close despite Epic Fury, it closed *because* of it. So, can we really grade the operation separately from its most predictable consequence? Further, if the strait is essentially already closed for free, what would Iran gain by shooting more? How do we distinguish "can't shoot" from "won't shoot" in the data? An 86% salvo drop is consistent with degraded capacity, but it's equally consistent with rational conservation by an adversary who's already winning the cost exchange.
More than fair, but I think misconstruing it as a strategic objective conflates the extraordinary operational successes of the named objectives, but also equally fair to consider this as a natural cost and consequence of the operation.
That's a fair distinction. But if the strait closure is a "natural cost and consequence," doesn't it have to appear somewhere in the assessment? If so, not really fair to exclude it when grading the operation.
Concur, the operational successes are real and impressive. But, the strategic environment is measurably worse than it was before Epic Fury: the strait is functionally closed, oil/gas/fertilizer/etc prices are elevated, and Iran is imposing costs without expending too many resources. Operational success and strategic deterioration can coexist. It's the American way!
Doesn't the causal chain run the other way? The White House chose escalation against a state whose almost entire deterrent leverage is geographic. The strait didn't close despite Epic Fury, it closed *because* of it. So, can we really grade the operation separately from its most predictable consequence? Further, if the strait is essentially already closed for free, what would Iran gain by shooting more? How do we distinguish "can't shoot" from "won't shoot" in the data? An 86% salvo drop is consistent with degraded capacity, but it's equally consistent with rational conservation by an adversary who's already winning the cost exchange.
More than fair, but I think misconstruing it as a strategic objective conflates the extraordinary operational successes of the named objectives, but also equally fair to consider this as a natural cost and consequence of the operation.
That's a fair distinction. But if the strait closure is a "natural cost and consequence," doesn't it have to appear somewhere in the assessment? If so, not really fair to exclude it when grading the operation.
Concur, the operational successes are real and impressive. But, the strategic environment is measurably worse than it was before Epic Fury: the strait is functionally closed, oil/gas/fertilizer/etc prices are elevated, and Iran is imposing costs without expending too many resources. Operational success and strategic deterioration can coexist. It's the American way!